Overview
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Certain Lexmark devices are vulnerable to unverified password changes and stored cross-site scripting attacks.

Description:
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Unverified Password Change – CVE-2013-6032
Certain models of Lexmark laser printers and MarkNet devices are vulnerable to an attack which allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to change the administrative password of the printer’s web administration interface. The interface does not perform sufficient validation of the vac.255.GENPASSWORD parameter in POST requests to the /cgi-bin/postpf/cgi-bin/dynamic/config/config.html page, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to reset the administrative password to an empty string.

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (‘Cross-site Scripting’) – CVE-2013-6033
Certain models of Lexmark laser printers are vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting attacks. The printers’ administrative web interface does not perform sufficient validation of user input to the “Location” and “Contact Name” fields in the “General Settings” configuration page.

Impact:
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An attacker may be able to run arbitrary script in the context of a victim’s browser. The attacker may also be able to gain full administrative control of the printer.

Solution:
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Apply an Update

Lexmark advises users to update to the latest firmware version. A list of affected models and firmware versions, as well as accompanying fixes, can be found at Lexmark’s advisory page.
Vendor Information: http://support.lexmark.com/alerts/

CVSS Metrics:
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Group Score Vector
Base 9.0 AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:C
Temporal 7.4 E:F/RL:OF/RC:C
Environmental 1.9 CDP:N/TD:L/CR:ND/IR:ND/AR:ND

Vendor Date Notified: 16 Oct 2013

I was informed last month of the release of the new “Faraday” penetration testing framework. A key feature of this framework is its ability to parse the output from various other security tools, including Foofus.Net’s Medusa! Here is the official release from the Infobyte folks:

We are happy to announce our first release of Faraday (beta), an open source collaborative Penetration Test IDE console that uses the same tools you use every day.

Faraday introduces a new concept (IPE) Integrated Penetration-Test Environment

We built a plugin system, where all the I/O from the terminal gets interpreted, if we have a plugin for the command, the output is processed and added to a knowledge base in a transparent way.

Our idea was to build a tool that helps from the perspective of a pentester without changing the way you work, adding the support for multi user collaboration on security testing projects.

Developed with a specialized set of functionalities that help users improve their own work adding collaborative data sharing, indexation and analysis of the generated knowledge during the engagement of a security audit.

[Features]
* +40 Plugins (Metasploit, Amap, Arachini, Dnsenum, Medusa, Nmap, Nessus, w3af, Zap and More!)
* Collaborative support
* Information Highlighting
* Knowledge Filtering
* Information Dashboard
* Conflict Detection
* Support for multiple Workspaces
* IntelliSense Support
* Easy Plugin Development
* XMLRPC, XML and Regex Parsers

Get it now:
http://www.faradaysec.com
https://github.com/infobyte/faraday

[Contact]
@faradaysec
#faraday-dev on irc.freenode.net

We hope you enjoy it!

Francisco Amato
http://www.linkedin.com/in/famato
http://twitter.com/famato

Infobyte LLC.
2699 S. Bayshore Dr #300.
[33133], Miami, FL
Phone: +1 305 851 3373
http://www.infobytesec.com
http://blog.infobytesec.com
http://twitter.com/infobytesec

 

On March 14, 2013 I released the white paper “Practical Exploitation Using Malicious SSIDs” at Black Europe in Amsterdam. This paper discuses the concept of leveraging SSIDs to inject various attacks into Wireless devices, and management consoles. The type of injection attacks discussed include XSS, CSRF,  and format strings attacks. A copy of the whitepaper can be downloaded from HERE.

Twitter: @percent_x

Its been almost a year since this firmware process hack was first discussed at CarolinaCon by percX. PercX has finally finished up his tutorial/white paper on the subject. In this paper he discusses the hack in-depth. Covering the step by step process around how to gain root level access to high end Xerox MFP devices, how the firmware signing process works, and how to protect yourself from this attack.  The paper can be downloaded by clicking here.

@percent_x

I got a very interesting note from Ryan Reynolds and Jonathan Claudius, who will be presenting at BlackHat and Defcon 20 in a few weeks. They discovered that, in certain circumstances, the hashes returned by tools like fgdump3 (which is a very limited “ask-and-you-shall-receive” research version I unveiled at ToorCon 2011) as well as HashDump are wrong. They have a proposed patch to HashDump, and I will be incorporating it into the fgdump3 branch as well.

 

FAQ

So does this affect fgdump2/2.1?

No – this only affects versions pulling their values right from the registry (which version 3 is doing).

 

Where is fgdump3 anyway?

I unofficially/quietly released version 3 at ToorCon last year. However, speed issues continued to plague me (changing permissions on the keys is SLOW), and I started looking for a new solution. Right now, the NEW fgdump3 is about 80% done, and combines the old injection method, the registry method, and a new “super s3kr1t” method that looks to work well, and quickly I might add. I have yet to finish the new version (about 80% complete), but I’m going to see if I can pound this out before DC 20 in time for their presentation. It will be ultra-beta, but something to play with.

 

How can I get a copy to play with?

I can send you the old fgdump3 if you want to play with the registry method – email me at fizzgig@foofus.net if you like. It’s unsupported and may cause nausea, but feel free to give it a shot. :)